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Abstract
We consider agents with non-linear preferences given by private values and private
budgets. We quantify the extent to which posted pricing approximately optimizes
welfare and revenue for a single agent. We give a reduction framework that extends
the approximation of multi-agent pricing-based mechanisms from linear utility to non-
linear utility. This reduction framework is broadly applicable as Alaei et al. (2012)
have shown that mechanisms for linear agents can generally be interpreted as pricing-
based mechanisms. We give example applications of the framework to oblivious posted
pricing (e.g., Chawla et al., 2010), sequential posted pricing (e.g., Yan, 2011), and
virtual surplus maximization (Myerson, 1981).
1 Introduction
Mechanism design for budgeted agents has been studied extensively in the literature as a
canonical model of non-linearity that challenges classical methods for mechanism design.
For selling a single item to a single-agent, if the agent has linear utility then posting a
take-it-or-leave-it price is optimal. On the other hand, for an agent with both a private
value and a private budget, posting a single price can be arbitrary bad against the optimal
mechanism (Example B.1) and the optimal mechanism may need an exponential-size menu
(Devanur and Weinberg, 2017). For selling to multiple agents, if the agents have linear utility
then (relatively simple) virtual value based mechanisms are optimal and (even simpler) price
posting mechanisms are approximately optimal. On the other hand, for an agent with non-
linear utility the optimal mechanism requires solving a convex program subject to interim
feasibility constraints (Alaei et al., 2012). This paper gives a general approach for reducing
non-linear approximation mechanisms to linear approximation mechanisms.
Single-agent price-posting is a key building-block in mechanism design for a linear agents.
Price posting is optimal for a single linear agent and a single item. For multiple linear
agents, Chawla et al. (2010) introduce both (a) oblivious posted pricings and (b) sequential
posted pricings and prove that these are good approximations in various environments. Yan
(2011) formalized the connection between sequential posted pricings and correlation gap
which governs their approximation. The approximation of oblivious posted pricings are often
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given by prophet inequalities, e.g., Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012), Feldman et al. (2016).
Moreover, the (c) optimal mechanism for linear agents can be viewed as reduction to single-
agent price posting (Bulow and Roberts, 1989; Alaei et al., 2012).
As noted above for non-linear agents, mechanisms based on price-posting are not gen-
erally good even for single-agent mechanisms. This paper defines a notion of single-agent
approximation by price-posting (see next paragraph) and shows that, for non-linear agents
that satisfy this definition, approximately optimal multi-agent price-posting-based mecha-
nisms can be derived from analogous mechanisms for linear agents. This reduction framework
allows many known approximation mechanisms for linear agents to be lifted to non-linear
agents environments. The approximation factors we obtain are the product of the single-
agent approximation factor of posted-pricing and the approximation factor of the linear
multi-agents mechanism. As examples of the reduction, we apply it to the simple linear-
agent mechanisms (a), (b), and (c), above.
The single-agent price-posting approximation that governs our reduction is defined as
follows. The literature on revenue optimal mechanism design for a single agent under ex
ante constraint defines the so-called revenue curve (cf. Bulow and Roberts, 1989). Fixing
any class of mechanisms and a single agent, the revenue curve is a mapping from an ex ante
constraint q ∈ [0, 1] to the revenue of the optimal mechanism in the family that sells with
the given ex ante probability q. Specifically, the price-posting revenue curve is generated by
fixing mechanism class to all price-posting mechanisms; and the optimal revenue curve is by
allowing all possible mechanisms. In this paper we consider general objectives and general
payoff curves that correspond to these objective. The posted-pricing approximation that
governs our reduction is the closeness of the concave hull of the price-posting payoff curve
and the optimal payoff curve.
Main Result. In Section 3, based on the definition of closeness between the price-posting
payoff curve and the optimal payoff curve, we introduce a reduction framework to approxi-
mately reduce the analysis of the approximation bounds for simple price-posting-based mech-
anisms for agents with non-linear utility to agents with linear utilities. We instantiate this
reduction framework with a set of constant-factor closeness results for agents with budgets
and a number of constant-factor approximation results for pricing-based mechanisms for lin-
ear agents to obtain constant-factor approximation of pricing-based mechanisms for agents
with budgets. Though we instantiate this reduction framework for agents with budgets, it
can be applied to agents with non-linear utility generally.1
For welfare-maximization (Section 4), we show constant closeness between the payoff
curves without any assumption on the valuation or the budget distribution. For revenue-
maximization (Section 5), we show constant-factor closeness between the payoff curves under
certain assumptions on the valuation or the budget distribution. We also construct examples
showing the necessity of our assumptions (Example B.1). Our single-agent analyses are
summarized in Table 1 with their corresponding assumptions.
For non-linear agents that that are each ζ-close, our framework reduces the multi-agent
ζ γ-approximation to linear agent γ-approximation. For order-oblivious posted pricing with
1 In this paper, we consider non-linear agents whose utility function is a mapping from her private type
and the outcome to her von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for the outcome.
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public budget private budget
revenue revenue welfare
assumption regular value
regular
value,
independent
budget
independent budget,
budget exceeds
expectation w.p.
at least 1/κ
ζ-closeness 1∗ 2∗ 3 (1 + 3κ− 1/κ) 2
approx-regularity 1∗ ∞∗ ∞∗‡
√
2(κ+ 2)(κ+ 1)
†
∞∗△
Table 1: Comparison of upper bounds for ζ-closeness in this paper and approximate reg-
ularity studied in Feng et al. (2019) under various assumptions. ∗ indicates tight ratio. †
requires both assumptions on valuation and budget distribution. ‡ is under the assumption
of regular valuation distribution and independent budget. △ is under the assumption of
independent budget and budget exceeding expectation w.p. at least 1/κ.
non-adaptive prices, when feasibility constraint is k-unit environment, γ = 2 (Chawla et al.,
2010). For order-oblivious posted pricing with adaptive prices, when feasibility constraint
is a matroid, γ = 2 (Kleinberg and Weinberg, 2012). For sequential posted pricings, when
feasibility constraint is a matroid, γ = e/(e− 1) and when the feasibility constraint is k-
unit environment, γ = 1/(1 − 1/√2pik) (cf. Yan, 2011). See Section 3.1 for detailed discussion.
Our construction of pricing-based mechanisms based on the optimal mechanisms for linear
agents (Section 3.2) gives γ equal to the gap between the ex ante relaxation and the optimal
mechanism (for linear agents).
Our analyses of the closeness between the concave hull of the price-posting payoff curve
and optimal payoff curve for agents with private budget are interesting independently of our
reduction framework. The setting of our single-agent analysis with an ex ante constraint
is equivalent to the mechanism design problem for a continuum of i.i.d. agents with unit-
demand and limited supply. For example, Richter (2016) shows that posted pricing is optimal
in the continuum model with regular and decreasing density value distribution and, critically,
no unit-demand constraint.
Related Work. Our work builds on the Feng et al. (2019) study of the approximation of
anonymous pricing for non-linear agents. For agents with linear utility, anonymous pricing
is a constant approximation to the optimal revenue if agents have regular distributions,
where the regularity is defined as the concavity of the price-posting revenue curve, which
implies the equivalence between the price-posting revenue curve and the optimal revenue
curve. Feng et al. (2019) define a notion of approximate regularity for agents with non-
linear utility, which characterizes (a) the closeness between price-posting revenue curve and
optimal revenue curve (i.e., how well posted pricing can approximate optimal mechanism for
a single agent), and (b) the approximate concavity of price-posting revenue curve (i.e., the
sensitivity of revenue against prices for a single agent). Then they introduce a reduction
framework which extends the approximation bound of anonymous pricing for linear agent
with regularity to non-linear agents with approximate regularity.
The main contributions of our results, relative to Feng et al. (2019), are the following four
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points. (i) We separate the definition of approximate regularity to closeness and approxi-
mate concavity. (The regularity assumption is unnecessary for non-anonymous pricing-based
mechanisms to be good approximations.) (ii) We relax the definition of closeness by con-
sidering the closeness between the concave hull of the price-posting payoff curve and the ex
ante payoff curve. Under this relaxed definition, we give tighter closeness bounds for rev-
enue and agents with private budgets. (iii) We extend the reduction framework to general
objectives besides revenue and give an analysis of welfare for agents with private budgets.
(iv) We extend the reduction framework from single-item environments to downward-closed
environments.
Next we further review the recent work on mechanism design for budgeted agents for
single-item and multi-unit environments.
Optimal mechanisms: In single-item environments, Laffont and Robert (1996) and Maskin
(2000) study the revenue-maximization and welfare-maximization problems for symmetric
agents with public budgets. Boulatov and Severinov (2018) generalize their results to agents
with i.i.d. values but asymmetric public budgets. Che and Gale (2000) consider the single
agent problem with private budget and decreasing-marginal-revenue valuation distribution,
and characterize the optimal mechanism by a differential equation. Devanur and Weinberg
(2017) consider the single agent problem with private budget and an arbitrary valuation dis-
tribution, characterize the optimal mechanism by a linear program, and use an algorithmic
approach to construct the solution. Pai and Vohra (2014) generalize the characterization of
the optimal mechanism for symmetric agents with public budgets to symmetric agents with
uniformly distributed private budgets. Richter (2016) shows that a price-posting mecha-
nism is optimal for selling a divisible good to a continuum of agents with private budgets
if their valuations are regular with decreasing density. For more general settings, no closed-
form characterizations are known. However, the optimal mechanism can be solved by a
polynomial-time solvable linear program over interim allocation rules (cf. Alaei et al., 2012;
Che et al., 2013).
Simple approximation mechanisms: In single-item environment, Feng et al. (2019) study
anonymous pricing and show constant approximations for budgeted agent with assump-
tions on the valuation and budget distributions. Abrams (2006) shows that posting the
market clearing price (the price where demand meets supply) gives a two approximation
to the revenue of the optimal mechanism for selling multiple units to a set of asymmetric
non-unit-demand agents with public values and public budgets. For matroid environment,
Chawla et al. (2011) show that a simple lottery mechanism is a constant approximation to
the optimal pointwise individually rational mechanism for agents with MHR valuation and
private budgets. Note that in our paper, the benchmark is the optimal mechanism under
interim individually rationality, and the revenue gap between those two benchmark mech-
anisms may be unbounded. For general feasibility constraints, Alaei et al. (2013) approx-
imately reduce the multi-agent problem to the single-agent ex ante optimization problem,
and show, for example, that in the special case of the single item environment, sequentially
running single agent ex ante optimal mechanisms gives an e/(e− 1)-approximation. However,
the ex ante optimal mechanism for single budgeted agent is still complicated. For multiple
items, Cheng et al. (2018) shows that selling items separately or as a bundle is approximately
optimal for a single agent with additive valuation.
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2 Preliminaries
In this paper, we consider general payoff maximization in downward-closed environment for
agents with budgets. For example, both welfare maximization and revenue maximization
are special cases of payoff maximization.
Agent Models. There is a set of agents N where |N | = n. An agent’s utility model is
defined as (T , F, u) where T , F , and u are the type space, distribution and utility function.
The outcome for an agent is the distribution over the pair (x, p), where allocation x ∈ {0, 1}
and payment p ∈ R+. The utility function of each player u is a mapping from her private
type and the outcome to her von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for the outcome.
A utility model of focus for the paper is the private-budget model : Each agent i ∈ N has
private value vi and private budget constraint wi. We refer to the pair (vi, wi) as the private
type of the agent. The valuation vi for each agent i is sampled from the marginal valuation
distribution Fi and her budget wi is sampled from the marginal budget distribution Gi. The
pair (vi, wi) is independent across different agents while we allow the value vi to be correlated
with budget wi for each agent i. We also use Fi and Gi to denote the cumulative probability
function for the valuation and budget of agent i. For each budgeted agent i, her utility given
an outcome (xi, pi) is ui = vixi− pi if the payment does not exceed her budget, i.e., pi ≤ wi.
Otherwise, her utility is ui = −∞. Note that this agent has linear utility if her budget is
always infinite. In the following sections, we will drop the subscripts when we discuss the
single agent problems.
Mechanisms. In this paper, we consider sealed-bid mechanisms: in a mechanism {(xi, pi)}i∈N ,
agents simultaneously submit sealed bids {bi}i∈N from their type spaces to the mechanism,
and each agent i gets allocation xi({bi}i∈N) with payment pi({bi}i∈N). The outcome of mech-
anisms is a distribution of the allocation payment pair (xi, pi) for each agent i where the
allocation is a probability xi ∈ [0, 1] and the price is pi ∈ R+. There is a downward-closed
constraint X ⊆ {0, 1}n on the set of feasible outcomes.
In this paper, we consider Bayesian incentive compatible (i.e. no agent can gain strictly
higher expected utility than reporting her private type truthfully if all other agents are
reporting their private types truthfully) and interim individual rational (i.e. the expected
utility is non-negative for all agents and all private types if all agents are reporting their
private types truthfully) mechanisms. For later discussion, we also define dominant strategy
incentive compatible for a mechanism if no agent can gain strictly higher expected utility
than reporting her private type truthfully, regardless of other agents’ report.
Payoff Curves. In this paragraph, we define the payoff curves, and introduce the revenue
curves and welfare curves as special cases of the payoff curves. More specifically, we define
the optimal payoff curves and price-posting payoff curves respectively.
Definition 2.1. Given ex ante constraint q, the optimal payoff curve R(q) is a mapping
from quantile q to the optimal ex ante payoff for the single agent problem, i.e., the optimal
payoff of the mechanism which in expectation sells the item with probability q.
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Fact 2.1. The optimal payoff curve is concave.
Fact 2.1 holds because the space of mechanisms is closed under convex combination. We
also study mechanisms based on simple per-unit posted posting.
Definition 2.2. Posting per-unit price p is offering a menu {(x, x · p) : x ∈ [0, 1]} to the
agent. A budgeted agent with value v and budget w given per-unit price p will purchase the
lottery x = min{1, w/p} if v ≥ p, and purchase the lottery x = 0 otherwise.
Definition 2.3. The market clearing price pq for the ex ante constraint q is the per-unit
price such that the item is sold with probability q.
Definition 2.4. Given ex ante constraint q, the price-posting payoff curve P (q) is a mapping
from quantile q to the optimal price-posting payoff for the single agent problem, i.e., the
optimal payoff of the price posting mechanism which sells the item with probability q in
expectation over the type distribution and the probabilities of the selected lottery.
Price-posting payoff curves are not generally concave, we can iron it to get the concave
hull of the price-posting payoff curves.
Definition 2.5. The ironed price-posting payoff curve P¯ is the concave hull of the price-
posting payoff curve P .
Next we review the relation between the optimal revenue curves and the concave hull of
the price-posting revenue curves for agents with linear utilities.
Lemma 2.2 (Bulow and Roberts, 1989). The optimal revenue curve R of a linear agent is
equal to her ironed price-posting revenue curve P¯ .
A similar result holds for the welfare curve. Note that the price-posting welfare curve is
always concave for agents with linear utility.
Lemma 2.3. The optimal welfare curve R of a linear agent is equal to her price-posting
welfare curve P , both are concave and R = P = P¯ .
In general, for agents with budgets, the optimal payoff (e.g., revenue or welfare) curves
and the concave hull of the price-posting payoff curves are not equivalent, and the ex ante
optimal mechanism is more complicated and extracts strictly higher payoff than the optimal
price posting mechanism and randomizations over price posting mechanisms.
Ex Ante Relaxation. Next we provide the benchmark of our paper, the ex ante relax-
ation. For auctions with downward-closed feasibility constraints, any sequence of ex ante
quantiles {qi}i∈N is ex ante feasible with respect to constraint X if there exists a randomized,
ex post feasible allocation such that the probability agent i receives an item, i.e., marginal
allocation probability for agent i, is exactly equal to qi. We denote the set of ex ante feasible
quantiles with respect to feasibility constraint X by EAF(X ). The optimal ex ante payoff
given a specific collection of payoff curves {Ri}i∈N and feasibility constraint X is
EAR({Ri}i∈N ,X ) = max
{qi}i∈N⊆EAF(X )
∑
i∈N
Ri(qi).
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3 Reduction Framework for pricing-based Mechanisms
In this section, we introduce a reduction framework that extends the approximation of any
multi-agent mechanisms for agents with linear utilities to agents with non-linear utilities (e.g.,
budgeted). To establish this result, we first formally define the analogue of any mechanism
from linear agents to non-linear agents (which we call pricing-based model-free mechanism,
Definition 3.2), and provide an algorithmic approach (Definition 3.3) to construct such an
analogue for deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. Next, we
show that the approximation guarantee of a mechanism for linear agents is generalized to
the approximation guarantee of the mechanism’s analogue for non-linear agents.
Definition 3.1. A model-free mechanism M̂ is a mapping from the utility models {(Ti, Fi, ui)}i∈N
of the agents to a well-defined mechanism M = {(xi, pi)}i∈N for those agents, where xi :∏
i∈N Ti → ∆({0, 1}) and pi :
∏
i∈N Ti → ∆(R+) for each agent i.
Definition 3.2. A model-free mechanism M̂ is pricing-based if given any utility model of
the agents with the same pricing-posting payoff curves {Pi}i∈N , let mechanism M be the
mechanism mapped from the model-free mechanism M̂, then
i. Identical payoff: the mechanism M has the same payoff, denoted M̂({Pi}i∈N ) ,
M({Pi}i∈N);
ii. Identical feasibility: the mechanism M has the same distribution over outcomes.
Myerson (1981) shows that the payoff of any mechanism ML for linear agents depends
only on their pricing-posting payoff curves {Pi}i∈N .
Lemma 3.1 (Myerson, 1981). In any mechanism ML = {(xi, pi)}i∈N for linear agents with
pricing-posting payoff curves {Pi}i∈N , the payoff is
∑
i∈N E[xi(vi(q)) · P
′
i (q)], where vi(q) ,
sup{v : Fi(v) = 1− q}. Denote the corresponding payoff as ML({Pi}i∈N).
For non-linear agents, however, mechanisms (e.g. revenue-optimal mechanism) are not
uniquely pinned down by the pricing-posting payoff curves in general. Adapting the tech-
nique from Alaei et al. (2013), we introduce an algorithmic approach to construct pricing-
based model-free mechanisms corresponding to any deterministic dominant strategy incentive
compatible mechanism for linear agents.
Implementation of Model-free Mechanisms. In this part we formally show how to
construct a model-free mechanism for agents with von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities given
any deterministic dominant-strategy incentive compatible mechanism for linear agents. The
construction is a simplification of a construction in Alaei et al. (2013) that is possible because
we are considering price-posting mechanisms for the single-agent problems.
For any linear agent environment, a deterministic dominant-strategy incentive compatible
mechanism ML can be represented by a mapping from the quantiles of other agents to a
threshold quantile for each agent. The agent wins when her quantile is below the threshold
and loses when her quantile is above the threshold. Denote the function that maps the profile
of other agent quantiles to a quantile threshold for agent i by qˆMLi ({qj}j∈N\{i}).
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For any non-linear agent model (T , F, u), the single-agent pricing problem identifies the
per-unit (market clearing) price pqˆ to offer the agent for any ex ante allocation constraint qˆ.
Denote the allocation probability selected by an agent with type t as xqˆ(t). A key property,
which will be discussed after the definition, is that xqˆ(t) is monotonic in qˆ.
Definition 3.3. The model-free mechanism M̂ for deterministic dominant-strategy incentive
compatible mechanism ML and agents {(Ti, Fi, ui)}i∈N is
1. For each agent i with private type ti, map the type to a random quantile qi according
to the cumulative distribution Hi(q) = x
q
i (ti).
2. For each agent i, calculate quantile threshold as qˆi = qˆ
ML
i ({qj}j∈N\{i}).
3. For each agent i, set payment as pqˆi xqˆii (t), and allocation xi = 1 if qi < qˆi and xi = 0
otherwise.
Definition 3.4. An item is an ordinary good for agents if when offered a per-unit price for
the item her demand is weakly decreasing in the price.
Definition 3.5 (Alaei et al., 2013). An agent has monotone ex ante mechanisms if, for any
private type, the probability she wins in the qˆ ex ante mechanism is monotone non-decreasing
in qˆ.
Restricting to price-posting mechanisms, the monotone ex ante mechanisms property is
satisfied for an ordinary good.
Lemma 3.2. For an ordinary good, agents have monotone ex ante mechanisms with respect
to price-posting payoff curves.
Proof. For an ordinary good by definition, every agent’s expected allocation probability
is weakly decreasing in the price. Thus, the per-unit price in each q ex ante mechanism
(with respect to the price-posting payoff curve P ) is weakly decreasing in q. Now consider
the q ex ante mechanism with respect to the ironed price-posting payoff curve P¯ for all
quantile q. The per-unit price is monotone (by the previous argument) on quantiles that
are not in ironed intervals. Within an ironed interval, the mechanism is a mix over two
end-points of non-ironed intervals which linearly interpolates between the end-points and is
thus monotone.
We now show that the model-free mechanism constructed in Definition 3.3 is well defined,
specifically, under the mild assumption that the agents utilities correspond to ordinary goods
(Definition 3.4) the function Gi of Step 1 is monotonic and can be viewed as a distribution
function. Finally, we show this model-free mechanism is pricing-based and guarantees the
same payoff as the original mechanism for linear agents.
Theorem 3.3. The mechanism M̂ defined in Definition 3.3 from the mechanism ML is a
pricing-based model-free mechanism which is dominant strategy incentive compatible, indi-
vidual rational and achieves the same payoff as the mechanism ML for linear agents.
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Proof. Since for each agent i, her type ti is drawn from Fi and qi is drawn from Hi condition
on ti, the (unconditional) distribution of qi is uniform on [0, 1]. Thus, from each agent
i’s perspective, the other agents’ quantiles are distributed independently and uniformly on
[0, 1]. This agent faces a distribution over ex ante posted pricing that is identical to the
distribution of “critical quantiles” in the mechanismML. Thus, the identical-payoff property
of Definition 3.1 is satisfied. Since the distribution of qi is uniform on [0, 1], the identical-
feasibility property is satisfied by construction.
Remark. Alaei et al. (2013) give a model-free mechanism that corresponds to marginal
payoff maximization with the single agent ex ante optimal mechanisms (rather than the ex
ante price-posting mechanisms). The advantage of our implementation (i.e. Definition 3.3)
with the ex ante price-posting mechanisms is two-fold. First, under a mild assumption (Def-
inition 3.4) the price-posting payoff curves always satisfy the above monotonicity property
and thus the reduction is simple. Second, the single-agent problems are simple and thus the
whole mechanism is simple.
Reduction of approximation guarantee through ζ-closeness. In this part, we define
ζ-closeness for a single agent with non-linear utility (Definition 3.6) which will later be used
in our reduction framework. For linear agents, the ironed price-posting payoff curves equal
the optimal payoff curves. For non-linear agents, however, the ironed price-posting payoff
curves are not generally equivalent to the optimal payoff curves. The ζ-closeness of an agent
measures how close her ironed price-posting payoff curve is to her optimal payoff curve.
Definition 3.6. An agent’s ironed price-posting payoff curve P¯ is ζ-close to her optimal
payoff curve R, if for all q ∈ [0, 1], there exists a quantile q† ≤ q such that P¯ (q†) ≥ 1/ζ ·R(q).
Such an agent is ζ-close.
Based on the definition of ζ-closeness, we present the meta-theorem (Theorem 3.4): a
reduction framework that extends the approximation of multi-agent mechanisms from linear
utilities to non-linear utilities.
Theorem 3.4. For downward-closed feasibility constraint X and agents with price-posting
payoff curves {Pi}i∈N and optimal payoff curves {Ri}i∈N , if each agent is ζ-close, and a linear
agent mechanism ML is a γ-approximation to the ex ante relaxation, i.e., ML({Pi}i∈N) ≥
1/ζ · EAR({P¯i}i∈N ,X ), then its corresponding pricing-based model-free mechanism M̂ is a
γ ζ-approximation to the ex ante relaxation for non-linear agents, i.e., M̂({Pi}i∈N) ≥ 1/γ ζ ·
EAR({Ri}i∈N ,X ).
Theorem 3.4 holds immediately from the definition of the pricing-based model-free mech-
anisms and the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5. For downward-closed feasibility constraint X and agents with ironed price-
posting payoff curves {P¯i}i∈N and the optimal payoff curves {Ri}i∈N , if each agent is ζ-close,
the ex ante relaxation on the ironed price-posting payoff curve is a ζ-approximation to the ex
ante relaxation on the optimal payoff curves, i.e., EAR({P¯i}i∈N ,X ) ≥ 1/ζ ·EAR({Ri}i∈N ,X ).
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Proof. Let {qi}i∈N ∈ EAF(X ) be the profile of optimal ex ante quantiles for optimal payoff
curves {Ri}i∈N . Since the ironed price-posting payoff curves {P¯i}i∈N are ζ-close to the
optimal payoff curves {Ri}i∈N , there exists a sequence of quantiles {q
†
i }i∈N such that for any
agent i, q†i ≤ qi and P¯ (q
†
i ) ≥ 1/ζ ·R(qi). Since X is downward-closed, {q
†
i }i∈N is also feasible
for EAF(X ). Therefore,
EAR({Ri}i∈N ,X ) =
∑
i∈N
Ri(qi) ≤ ζ ·
∑
i∈N
P¯i(q
†
i ) ≤ ζ · EAR({P¯i}i∈N ,X ).
Optimal mechanisms for agents with private budget utility have been studied in the litera-
ture (e.g. Che and Gale (2000); Devanur and Weinberg (2017) for single-agent, Pai and Vohra
(2014) for i.i.d. agents and Alaei et al. (2012) for non-i.i.d. agents). The characterization of
these optimal mechanisms are complicated even for simple distributions (e.g. uniform value
and uniform budget). However, with the reduction framework in Theorem 3.4, due to the
closeness between price-posting payoff curve and optimal payoff curve, we can approximately
extend simple mechanisms from linear agents to non-linear agents.
Example 3.7 (Uniform value, uniform budget, numerical). For a private-budgeted agent
with value and budget both drawn uniformly from [0, 1], her price-posting revenue curve is
roughly 1.02-close to her optimal revenue curve. See Figure 1a and Appendix C for more
details.
3.1 Posted Pricing Mechanism
In this subsection, we focus on posted pricing mechanisms, for which the construction of the
corresponding pricing-based model-free mechanism is simpler than Definition 3.3. We apply
closeness property between the ironed price-posting payoff curve and optimal payoff curve
to obtain approximation results for agents with non-linear utility. In particular, we consider
the following three families of mechanisms:
1. sequential posted pricing (with non-adaptive prices): agents in sequence (specified by
mechanisms) are offered take-it-or-leave-it non-adaptive prices.
2. oblivious posted pricing with non-adaptive prices : agents in sequence (unknown to
mechanisms in advance) are offered take-it-or-leave-it non-adaptive prices.
3. oblivious posted pricing with adaptive prices2: agents in sequence (unknown to mech-
anisms in advance) are offered take-it-or-leave-it adaptive prices.
All posted pricing mechanisms for linear agents can be converted into quantile space
without loss of generality.
Definition 3.8. The model-free mechanism M̂ for posted pricing mechanismML and agents
{(Ti, Fi, ui)}i∈N is
2With the technique online contention resolution introduced by Feldman et al. (2016), it is known that
for some environments (e.g. matroid) the same approximation bounds with adaptive prices can be guaranteed
in oblivious posted pricing which posts non-adaptive prices but adaptively rejects agents.
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1. For each agent i, map the price pi posted to agent i in mechanism ML to quantile qˆi,
i.e., the probability that the item is sold to a linear agent with the same price-posting
payoff curve.
2. For each agent i, post the market clearing price pqˆi.
For agents with linear utilities, the approximations for posted pricing mechanisms against
the optimal Bayesian mechanisms have been studied in Chawla et al. (2010); Yan (2011);
Feldman et al. (2016), etc. Note that our reduction framework Theorem 3.4 requires a
stronger guarantee (i.e. an approximation of γ against the ex ante relaxation) for linear
agents. For sequential posted pricing, we can directly apply the approximation results for
linear agents given by correlation gap (cf. Agrawal et al., 2010; Yan, 2011) in our framework,
since the benchmark for correlation gap is indeed the ex ante relaxation. However, for
oblivious posted pricing with/without adaptive prices, approximation results for linear agents
are given by prophet inequalities (Definition 3.10), where the standard benchmark is smaller
than the ex ante relaxation. Therefore, a stronger definition (i.e. ex ante prophet inequality
Definition 3.11) is required for the reduction to non-linear agents.
Definition 3.9 (Bayesian online selection problem). A gambler faces a series of n games,
one on each of n days. Game i has prize vi drawn independently from distribution Fi. There
is a feasibility constraint X including all subsets of prizes which the gambler can pick. The
gambler knows the feasibility constraint and the prize distribution in advance. On day i
the gambler realizes the prize vi ∼ Fi of game i and must immediately make an irrevocable
decision on whether to select this prize. The final set of prizes selected must satisfies feasibility
constraint X . The gambler’s value is the total value of prizes selected.
Definition 3.10 (prophet inequality). In Bayesian online selection problem, prophet in-
equality is the ratio of the gambler with an online algorithm to a prophet who knows all
prize realizations in advance and picks any feasible subset respect to feasibility constraint X .
Definition 3.11 (ex ante prophet inequality). In Bayesian online selection problem, ex ante
prophet inequality compares the gambler to the ex ante relaxation (a.k.a. the expected value
of an ex ante prophet).
In fact, for certain feasibility constraints, the approximation guarantees in ex ante prophet
inequality are the same as in the original prophet inequality. Lee and Singla (2018) proved
that the same approximation bound (i.e. 2) holds for matroid environments. In Section 6, we
introduce a meta approach (Proposition 6.2) to extend the results from prophet inequalities
to ex ante prophet inequalities. Applying this meta approach to the analysis in Chawla et al.
(2010) for k-unit environment and Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012) for matroid environment,
we extend their results to ex ante prophet inequalities with basically the same argument.
In conclusion, the approximation guarantee γ of sequential posted pricing for linear is
given by correlation gap. For matroid environment, γ is e/(e− 1); and for k-unit environ-
ment, γ is 1/(1− 1/√2pik) (Agrawal et al., 2010; Yan, 2011). For oblivious posted pricing, the
approximation guarantee γ is given by ex ante prophet inequality. For k-unit environment,
γ is 2 with non-adaptive prices (Section 6); for matching environment, γ is 6.75 with non-
adaptive prices (Chawla et al., 2010); and for matroid environment, γ is 2 with adaptive
prices (Appendix A).
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3.2 Marginal Payoff Mechanism
The ex ante relaxation gives an upper bound on the optimal mechanism. The amount by
which it is an upper bound depends on the feasibility constraint and the single-agent payoff
curves. In the special case of linear agents, the gap between the ex ante relaxation and the
optimal mechanism is precisely determined by the payoff curves and the feasibility constraint.
Definition 3.12. The ex ante gap for feasibility constraint X and optimal payoff curves
{Ri}i∈N is the ratio between the ex ante relaxation EAR({Ri}i∈N ,X ) and the payoff of the
optimal mechanism for linear agents OPT({Ri}i∈N ,X ).
By applying the marginal revenue mechanism of Bulow and Roberts (1989) in Defini-
tion 3.3, we obtain the model-free pricing-based marginal payoff mechanism. The implemen-
tation is simpler than Alaei et al. (2013) where the marginal revenue mechanism is imple-
mented based on the ex ante optimal mechanisms.
Definition 3.13. The pricing-based model-free marginal payoff mechanism, denoted by
MPMX , is the pricing-based model-free mechanism (defined in Definition 3.3) that cor-
responds to the linear agent marginal revenue mechanism subject to feasibility constraint
X . Denote the payoff of MPMX for agents with price-posting payoff curves {Pi}i∈N as
MPMX ({Pi}i∈N).
Theorem 3.6. For downward-closed feasibility constraint X , given agents with the ironed
price-posting payoff curves {P¯i}i∈N and the optimal payoff curves {Ri}i∈N , if each agent
is ζ-close, the worst case ratio between the the marginal payoff mechanism with respect to
price-posting payoff curves and the ex ante relaxation on the optimal payoff curves is ζγ, i.e.,
MPMX ({Pi}i∈N) ≥ 1/ζγ · EAR({Ri}i∈N ,X ), where γ is the ex ante gap for X with curves
{P¯i}i∈N .
For matroid environments, applying correlation gap, the gap between optimal payoff and
ex ante relaxation for linear agents is at most e/(e− 1). For k-unit environment, it is at most
1/(1 − 1/√2pik). We note that these worst-case bounds against the ex ante relaxation are the
same as those given by the sequential posted pricings that follow from the correlation gap
(discussed previously). However, the advantage of using the marginal payoff mechanism over
these sequential pricings is the same magnitude as the advantage of using the optimal mech-
anism over sequential posted pricing for linear agents. There can be significant improvement
in payoff. We quantify the benefits of using marginal payoff mechanism for budgeted agents
with uniform distributions in Figure 1b. Moreover, for downward-closed environments, the
gap between optimal payoff and ex ante relaxation for linear agents is at most O(logn)
(Alaei et al., 2013).
4 Closeness for Welfare Maximization
We have introduced the welfare curve and the reduction framework for any payoff functions.
In this section, we will focus on showing that for agents with budgets, the ironed price-posting
welfare curve is close to the optimal welfare curve.
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Figure 1: Figure 1a illustrates the comparison between the price-posting revenue curve
(dashed line) and the ex ante revenue curve (solid line) for selling a single item to a private-
budgeted agent with value and budget both drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. The x-axis is the
ex ante probability and the y-axis is the expected revenue. The price-posting revenue curve
for this uniform budgeted agent is 1.02-close to her ex ante revenue curve.
Figure 1b illustrates the comparison between approximation ratio of optimal oblivious posted
pricing (grey line) and marginal payoff mechanism (black line) to the ex ante relaxation
for selling a single item to i.i.d. private-budgeted agents with value and budget both drawn
uniformly from [0, 1]. The x-axis is the number of agents and the y-axis is the approximation
ratio. When there are 15 agents, the approximation ratio for oblivious posted pricing is 1.23
and the approximation ratio for marginal payoff mechanism is 1.11. Note that the revenue
for optimal oblivious posted pricing is calculated by backward induction instead of applying
the prices from correlation gap. See Appendix C for more details.
The ex ante optimal mechanism might be complicated and hard to characterize. However,
as we show below, without any assumption on the valuation distribution or the budget
distribution, posting the market clearing price guarantees a 2-approximation in welfare.
Theorem 4.1. For a single agent with private-budget utility and any ex ante constraint q, the
welfare from market clearing is a 2-approximation to ex ante optimal welfare, i.e., the price-
posting welfare curve is 2-close to the optimal welfare curve, which implies that the ironed
price-posting welfare curve P¯ is 2-close to the optimal welfare curve R, i.e., P¯ (q) ≥ 1/2 ·R(q)
for any q.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 adapts the price decomposition technique from Feng et al.
(2019) and extends it for welfare analysis.
Fix an arbitrary ex ante constraint q, denote EX as the q ex ante welfare-optimal
mechanism, and Payoff[EX] as its welfare. We want to decompose EX into two mecha-
nisms EX† and EX‡ according to the market clearing price pq and bound the welfare from
those two mechanisms separately. The decomposed mechanism may violate the incentive
constraint for budgets, and we refer to this setting as the random-public-budget utility
model. Note that the market clearing price is the same in both the private budget model
and the random-public-budget utility model. Intuitively, mechanism EX† contains per-unit
prices at most the market clearing price, while mechanism EX‡ contains per-unit prices at
least the market clearing price. Both mechanisms EX† and EX‡ satisfy the ex ante con-
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straint q, and the sum of their welfare upper bounds the original ex ante mechanism EX,
i.e., Payoff[EX] ≤ Payoff
[
EX†
]
+Payoff
[
EX‡
]
.
To construct EX† and EX‡ that satisfy the properties above, we first introduce a char-
acterization of all incentive compatible mechanisms for a single agent with private-budget
utility, and her behavior in the mechanisms.
Definition 4.1 (Feng et al., 2019). An allocation-payment function τ : [0, 1] → R+ is a
mapping from the allocation x to the payment p.
Lemma 4.2 (Feng et al., 2019). Any incentive compatible mechanism for a private budgeted
agent is equivalent to providing a convex and non-decreasing allocation-payment function for
each budget and letting the agent choose the utility maximization allocation and payment
according to the allocation-payment functions.
Now we give the construction of EX† and EX‡ by constructing their allocation-payment
functions. For agent with budget w, let τw be the allocation-payment function in mechanism
EX, and x∗w be the utility maximization allocation for a linear agent with value equal to the
market clearing price pq, i.e., x∗w = argmax{x : τ
′
w(x) ≤ p
q}. For agents with budget w, we
define the allocation-payment functions τ †w and τ
‡
w for EX
† and EX‡ respectively below,
τ †w(x) =
{
τw(x) if x ≤ x
∗
w,
∞ otherwise;
τ ‡w(x) =
{
τw(x
∗
w + x)− τw(x
∗
w) if x ≤ 1− x
∗
w,
∞ otherwise.
By construction, for each type of the agent, the allocation from EX is upper bounded by
the sum of the allocation from EX† and EX‡, which implies that the welfare from EX is
upper bounded by the sum of the welfare from EX† and EX‡, and the requirements for the
decomposition are satisfied.
As sketched above, we separately bound the welfare in EX† and EX‡ by the welfare from
posting the market clearing price.
Lemma 4.3. For a single agent with random-public-budget utility, independently distributed
value and budget, and any ex ante constraint q, the welfare from posting the market clearing
price pq is at least the welfare from EX†, i.e., P (q) ≥ Payoff
[
EX†
]
.
Proof. Consider agent with type (v, w) and agent with type (v′, w), where both value v and v′
are higher than the market clearing price pq. Notice that the allocations for these two types
are the same in EX† and in market clearing, since the per-unit price in both mechanisms is
at most pq which makes the mechanisms unable to distinguish these two types.
Let x† be the allocation rule in EX† and let xq be the allocation rule in posting the
market clearing price pq. For any value v ≥ pq, and for any budget w, the allocation for
type (v, w) is lower in EX† than in market clearing, i.e., x†(v, w) ≤ xq(v, w). Otherwise
suppose the type (v∗, w) has strictly higher allocation in EX† for some value v∗ ≥ pq, i.e,
x†(v∗, w) > xq(v∗, w). By the fact stated in previous paragraph, we have that for any budget
w and any value v, v∗ ≥ pq, xq(v, w) = xq(v∗, w), x†(v, w) = x†(v∗, w), and the expected
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allocation in EX† is
Ev,w
[
x†(v, w)
]
≥ Pr[v ≥ pq] · Ev,w
[
x†(v, w) | v ≥ pq
]
= Pr[v ≥ pq] · Ev,w
[
x†(v∗, w) | v ≥ pq
]
> Pr[v ≥ pq] · Ev,w[x
q(v∗, w) | v ≥ pq]
= Pr[v ≥ pq] · Ev,w[x
q(v, w) | v ≥ pq] = q,
which implies EX† violates the ex ante constraint q, a contradiction. Further, for any type
(v, w) with v ≥ pq, x†(v, w) ≤ xq(v, w) implies that the allocation in market clearing “first
order stochastic dominantes” the allocation in EX†, i.e., for any budget w, and for any
threshold v†, the allocation from all types with value v ≥ v† and budget w in market clearing
is at least the allocation from those types in EX†. Taking expectation over the valuation
and the budget, the expected welfare from market clearing is at least the welfare from EX†,
i.e., P (q) ≥ Payoff
[
EX†
]
.
Lemma 4.4. For a single agent with random-public-budget utility, independently distributed
value and budget, and any ex ante constraint q; the welfare from market clearing is at least
the welfare from EX‡, i.e., P (q) ≥ Payoff
[
EX‡
]
.
Proof. In both EX‡ and market clearing, types with value lower than pq will purchase noth-
ing, so we only consider the types with value at least pq in this proof. Consider any type
(v, w) where v ≥ pq, its allocation in market clearing is at least its allocation in EX‡, because
the per-unit price in EX‡ is higher. Thus, the welfare from market clearing is at least the
welfare from EX‡, i.e., P (q) ≥ Payoff
[
EX‡
]
.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Combining Lemma 4.3 and 4.4, for any quantile q, we have
R(q) = Payoff[EX] ≤ Payoff
[
EX†
]
+Payoff
[
EX‡
]
≤ 2P (q) ≤ max
q′≤q
2P¯ (q′).
5 Closeness for Revenue Maximization
In this section we analyze the closeness of ex ante and price-posting revenue curves. We
show that approximate closeness is satisfied under weaker assumptions than those given by
Feng et al. (2019). Since we improve the definition of closeness by comparing the ironed
price-posting revenue curve with the optimal revenue curve. For simplicity, in this section,
we use the notation Payoffw[·] to denote the revenue given any mechanism if the budget of
the agent is w, and Payoff[·] to denote the revenue by taking expectation over the budget w.
5.1 Public Budget
In this section, we consider the setting where agents have public budgets. For an agent
with a public budget, Feng et al. (2019) show that the ironed price-posting revenue curve is
1-close to her optimal revenue curve if her valuation distribution is regular (Theorem 5.1).
Here we show that for agents with general valuation distribution, the ironed price-posting
revenue curve is 2-close to her optimal revenue curve (Theorem 5.3).
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Figure 2: The thin solid line is the allocation rule for the optimal ex ante mechanism.
The thick dashed line on the left side is the allocation of the decomposed mechanism with
lower price, while the thick dashed line on the right side is the allocation of the decomposed
mechanism with higher price.
Theorem 5.1 (Feng et al., 2019). An agent with public budget and regular valuation distri-
bution has the ironed price-posting revenue curve P¯ that equals to (i.e. 1-close) her optimal
revenue curve R.
For an agent with a general valuation distribution, closeness follows from a characteriza-
tion of the ex ante optimal mechanism from Alaei et al. (2013).
Lemma 5.2 (Alaei et al., 2013). For a single agent with public budget, the q ∈ [0, 1] ex ante
optimal mechanism has a menu with size at most two.
Theorem 5.3. An agent with public budget has the ironed price-posting revenue curve P¯
that is 2-close to her optimal revenue curve R.
Proof. By Lemma 5.2, the allocation rule xq of the ex ante revenue maximization mechanism
for the single agent with public budget has a menu of size at most two. We decompose its
allocation into xL and xH as illustrated in Figure 2. Note that both allocation xL and xH
are (randomized) price-posting allocation rules, and neither allocation violates the allocation
constraint q. Thus,
R(q) = Payoff[xq] = Payoff[xL] +Payoff[xH ] ≤ 2 max
q†≤q
P¯ (q†).
5.2 Private Budget
In this section, we study the closeness of the ironed price-posting revenue curve and the opti-
mal revenue curve for agents with private budget. For agents with linear utilities, those two
curves are equivalent for any valuation distribution. However, for an agent with private bud-
get, the gap between them can be unbounded. Specifically, according to Feng et al. (2019),
when the budget distribution is correlated with the valuation distribution, posting prices is
not a constant approximation to the optimal revenue for a single agent even with strong regu-
larity assumption on the marginal valuation distribution and budget distribution. Therefore,
in this section, we focus on the case when the budget distribution is independent with the
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valuation distribution for each agent. Note that even with the independence assumption,
without any further assumption on the valuation or the budget distribution, posting prices
is not approximately optimal even for a single agent, see Example B.1 in the appendix.
Therefore, we consider mild assumption on either the valuation distribution or the budget
distribution and show the corresponding closeness property.
From Feng et al. (2019), we know that regularity on the valuation distribution is sufficient
to guarantee the closeness between the ironed price-posting revenue curves and the optimal
revenue curve, without further assumption on the budget distribution.
Theorem 5.4 (Feng et al., 2019). A single agent with private-budget utility and regular
valuation distribution has a ironed price-posting revenue curve P¯ that is 3-close to her optimal
revenue curve R, if her value and budget are independently distributed.
We also consider the assumption that the budget exceeds its expectation with constant
probability at least 1/κ. This assumption on budget distribution is also studied in Cheng et al.
(2018) and Feng et al. (2019). Notice that a common distribution assumption, monotone
hazard rate, is a special case of it with κ = e (cf. Barlow and Marshall, 1965).
Theorem 5.5. A single agent with private-budget utility has a price-posting revenue curve P
that is (1 + 3κ− 1/κ)-close to her optimal revenue curve R, if her value and budget are
independently distributed, and the probability the budget exceeds its expectation is 1/κ.
Theorem 5.5 implies that for this private-budget agent, her ironed price-posting revenue
curve P¯ is also (1 + 3κ− 1/κ)-close to her optimal revenue curve R. Let w∗ denote the
expected budget of the agent. For any ex ante constraint q, denote EX as the q ex ante
optimal mechanism. We consider two cases whether the market clearing price pq is larger
than the expected budget w∗. For the case where the market clearing price is at least the
expected budget w∗, we use Lemma 5.6 in Feng et al. (2019).
Lemma 5.6 (Feng et al., 2019). When the market clearing price pq is at least the expected
budget w∗, Payoff[EX] ≤ (2 + κ− 1/κ)P (q).
Now we focus on the case where the market clearing price is smaller than the expected
budget, i.e., pq < w∗. Our analysis here is similar to the analysis for welfare, i.e., the
price decomposition technique. Consider the decomposition of EX into three mechanisms
EX†, EX§ and EX‡ such that mechanism EX† contains per-unit prices at most the market
clearing price, mechanism EX‡ contains per-unit prices at least the expected budget, while
mechanism EX§ contains per-unit prices between the market clearing price and the expected
budget. All mechanisms satisfy the ex ante constraint q, and the sum of their welfare is
upper bounded by the welfare of the original ex ante mechanism EX, i.e., Payoff[EX] ≤
Payoff
[
EX†
]
+Payoff
[
EX§
]
+Payoff
[
EX‡
]
.
We construct the allocation-payment functions τ †w, τ
‡
w and τ
§
w for EX
†, EX‡, and EX§
respectively. For each budget w, let τw be the allocation-payment function for types with
budget w in mechanism EX, and x∗w be the utility maximization allocation for the agent with
value and budget equal to the market clearing price pq, i.e., x∗w = argmax{x : τ
′
w(x) ≤ p
q}.
Let x♯w be the utility maximization allocation for the agent with value and budget equal to
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the expected budget w∗, i.e., x♯w = argmax{x : τ
′
w(x) ≤ w
∗}. Then the allocation-payment
functions τ †w, τ
‡
w and τ
§
w are defined respectively as follows,
τ †w(x) =
{
τw(x) if x ≤ x
∗
w,
∞ otherwise;
τ §w(x) =
{
τw(x
∗
w + x)− τw(x
∗
w) if x ≤ x
♯
w − x
∗
w,
∞ otherwise;
τ ‡w(x) =
{
τw(x
♯
w + x)− τw(x
♯
w) if x ≤ 1− x
♯
w,
∞ otherwise.
Lemma 5.7 (Feng et al., 2019). When pq ≤ w∗, Payoff
[
EX†
]
≤ P (q) and there exists
q† ∈ [0, q] such that Payoff
[
EX‡
]
≤ (1 + κ− 1/κ) · P (q†).
Lemma 5.8. For a single agent with private-budget utility, independently distributed value
and budget, when pq ≤ w∗, there exists q† ≤ q such that the ironed price-posting revenue from
q† is a (2κ− 1)-approximation to the revenue from EX§, i.e., (2κ− 1)P (q†) ≥ Payoff
[
EX§
]
.
Proof. Let q† = argmaxq′≤q P (q
′). Suppose the support of the budget distribution is from
[
¯
w, w¯]. Let p˜ be the price larger than the market clearing price pq and smaller than the
expected budget w∗ that maximizes revenue without the budget constraint. Consider the
following calculation with justification below.
Payoff
[
EX§
]
=
∫ w∗
¯
w
Payoffw
[
τ §w
]
dG(w) +
∫ w¯
w∗
Payoffw
[
τ §w
]
dG(w)
(a)
≤
∫ w∗
¯
w
Payoffw∗
[
τ §w
]
dG(w) +
∫ w¯
w∗
w
w∗
Payoffw∗
[
τ §w
]
dG(w)
(b)
≤
∫ w∗
¯
w
Payoffw∗[p˜] dG(w) +
∫ w¯
w∗
w
w∗
Payoffw∗ [p˜] dG(w)
(c)
≤ (2−
1
κ
)Payoffw∗ [p˜]
(d)
≤ (2κ− 1)Payoff[p˜]
(e)
≤ (2κ− 1)P (q†).
Inequality (a) holds because given the allocation payment function τ §w, the revenue only
increases if we increase the budget to w∗, i.e., Payoffw
[
τ §w
]
≤ Payoffw∗
[
τ §w
]
for any w ≤ w∗.
Moreover, for any w > w∗, given the allocation payment function τ §w, the revenue is either
the same for budget w and w∗, or the budget binds for agent with expected budget w∗.
Since the revenue from agent with budget w is at most w, we know that Payoffw
[
τ §w
]
≤
w/w∗ · Payoffw∗
[
τ §w
]
. Note that for allocation payment rule τ §w, per-unit prices are larger
than the market clearing price pq and smaller than the expected budget w∗, and budget
does not bind for agents with budget w∗. Therefore, by definition, the optimal per-unit
price in this range is p˜, Payoffw∗
[
τ §w
]
≤ Payoffw∗[p˜] and inequality (b) holds. Inequality
(c) holds because
∫ w∗
¯
w
dG(w) ≤ 1 − 1/κ by the assumption that the probability the budget
exceeds its expectation is at least κ, and
∫ w¯
w∗
w
w∗dG(w) ≤ 1. Inequality (d) holds because
Payoffw∗ [p˜] ≤ κ · Payoff[p˜] for any randomized prices p˜ according to Cheng et al. (2018).
Inequality (e) holds by the definition of the price-posting revenue curve P and quantile q†,
the fact that price p˜ is larger than the market clearing price pq.
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Proof of Theorem 5.5. Let q† = argmaxq′≤q P (q
′). Combining Lemma 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8, we
have
Payoff[EX] ≤ Payoff
[
EX†
]
+Payoff
[
EX‡
]
+Payoff
[
EX§
]
≤ (1 + 3κ− 1/κ)P (q†).
6 Ex Ante Prophet Inequality
Prophet inequality, which is closely related to oblivious posted pricing for agents with linear
utility, mostly analyzes the approximation guarantee of online algorithms with respect to
the optimal offline algorithm. To study the approximation of posted pricing for non-linear
agents, our framework utilize results in ex ante prophet inequality, a stronger version with
respect to ex ante relaxation.
In this section, we provide meta approach, which shows that some prophet inequality
results in the literature can be extended to be ex ante prophet inequalities. The main idea
is as follows, (a) show the gambler with an online algorithm under product distribution can
approximate the ex post prophet who can correlate realizations with the same marginals;
(b) construct a correlated distribution with the same marginals such that the expected value
of the ex post prophet given the correlated distribution is equivalent to the expected value
of the ex ante prophet.
Lemma 6.1. The expected value of an ex ante prophet subject to ex ante feasible quantiles
EAF(X ) is equal to the ex post prophet who can correlate prize realization (with the same
marginals) and picks feasible subset subject to feasibility constraint X .
Proof. For any prize distributions {Fi}i∈N and feasibility constraint X , lemma statement is
equivalent to the existence of a correlated distribution v′ such that
1. The marginal distribution of v′i is from Fi.
2. The expected value of the ex post prophet with this correlated distribution equals to the
ex ante prophet with product distribution, i.e., Ev′[Payoff[v
′,X ]] = EAR({Fi}i∈N ,X ).
The existence of the correlation distribution is guaranteed by the following construction.
Given any distributions {Fi}i∈N and feasibility constraint X , suppose q is the optimal ex ante
probability profile and D is the distribution over feasible set which induces q. To generate
correlated distribution v′, we first sample a set S under distribution D, and for each agent i,
sample vi from Fi conditional on vi ≥ v
qi
i if i ∈ S, and sample vi from Fi conditional on
vi < v
qi
i if i 6∈ S, where v
qi
i is the value such that Prv∼Fi[v ≥ v
qi
i ] = qi.
First note that the marginal distribution for agent i in correlated distribution v′ is Fi.
By selecting the set S associate with each realized valuation profile v′, which is feasible
for the feasibility constraint X , we have EAR({Fi}i∈N ,X ) ≤ Ev′ [Payoff[v
′,X ]]. Since the
marginal distribution for each agent i is Fi, we have EAR({Fi}i∈N ,X ) ≥ Ev′[Payoff[v
′,X ]].
Therefore, EAR({Fi}i∈N ,X ) = Ev′ [Payoff[v
′,X ]].
Proposition 6.2. For any prophet inequality bound which is obtained by comparing the
gambler’s value to an upper bound on the prophet’s value and where the upper bound is
invariant to correlation structure on prize distribution, the gambler’s algorithm obtains the
same approximation bound for the ex ante prophet inequality.
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We apply Proposition 6.2 to obtain ex ante prophet inequality under k-unit environment.
For general matroid, we obtain the same ratio with adaptive prices and defer its proof to
Appendix A.
Theorem 6.3. For k-unit environment X , and for linear agents with distributions {Fi}i∈N ,
there exists an anonymous threshold θ such that
Payoff[θ, {Fi}i∈N ,X ] ≥ 1/2 · EAR({Fi}i∈N ,X )
where Payoff[θ, {Fi}i∈N ,X ] is the expected welfare of threshold θ, and EAR({Fi}i∈N ,X ) is
the optimal ex ante relaxation.
Proof. By Chawla et al. (2010), for k-unit environments, there exists an anonymous thresh-
old θ such that
2Payoff[θ, {Fi}i∈N ,X ] ≥ (kθ +
∑
i∈N Evi[(vi − θ)
+]) ≥ Ev[maxi vi] .
Note that the upper bound of the optimal payoff kθ +
∑
i∈N Evi [(vi − θ)
+] considered in
Chawla et al. (2010) is invariant to correlation structure. Therefore, by applying Proposi-
tion 6.2, there exists an anonymous threshold θ that achieves 2-approximation to the ex ante
relaxation.
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Appendix
A Ex Ante Matroid Prophet Inequality
In this section, we reduce the ex ante prophet inequality for matroid environment to the
matroid prophet inequality analysis in Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012). Our reduction does
not require the matroid property.
Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012) consider algorithms with adaptive threshold θ = {θi}i∈N
in prophet inequality for downward-closed environment: every prize i is selected if and
only if vi ≥ θi.
3 They define the property α-balanced threshold and show that it implies
α-approximation against an (ex post) prophet. Finally, they design an algorithm with 2-
balanced threshold for matroid environment. In this section, we generalize the α-balanced
threshold (Definition A.1) with correlation and show that it implies α-approximation against
ex ante prophet (Lemma A.1). The proof follows from Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012)’s
original argument, with the observation that independence among prizes is unnecessary.
Notably the algorithm in Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012) constructs a threshold for matroid
set system that satisfies the generalized 2-balanced threshold property.
For this extension, we first generalize their notion of α-balanced thresholds to correlated
distributions on valuations. Let v = {vi}i∈N and v
′ = {v′i}i∈N be the valuation profiles
drawn from the independent and correlated distribution, respectively.4 We assume v and v′
are independent and have the same marginal distribution. Let θ = {θi}i∈N be the threshold
in algorithm A where θi is independent of {vj}
n
j=i and v
′. Denote A = {i ∈ [n] : vi ≥ θi} as
set of prizes chosen by threshold θ. Denote B as the feasible set in X that maximizes the
total value in the set for valuation profile v′. Let C(A), R(A) be a partition of B such that
(i) A∩R(A) = ∅ and A∪R(A) is a basis for the matroid; and (ii) maximizes the total value
of set R(A). Next we formally define α-balanced thresholds for the correlated benchmark.
Definition A.1. For a parameter α > 1, an algorithm A has α-balanced threshold θ if for
all valuation profile v,
∑
i∈A
θi ≥
1
α
· Ev′
 ∑
i∈C(A)
v′i
 and Ev′
 ∑
i∈R(A)
θi
 ≤ (1− 1
α
) · Ev′
 ∑
i∈R(A)
v′i
 .
Lemma A.1. Any algorithm A with α-balanced threshold is an α-approximation to the ex
ante prophet.
3In downward-closed environment, without loss of generality, an algorithm with adaptive threshold guar-
antees to output a feasible set of prizes selected, as it can set threshold θi =∞ to reject prize i.
4 Think v as the valuation profile which an algorithm A executes by the gambler, and v′ as the valuation
profile which observed by ex ante prophet.
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Proof. Invoking Proposition 6.2, it is sufficient to show
Ev
[∑
i∈A
vi
]
≥
1
α
· Ev′
[∑
i∈B
v′i
]
.
Since C(A) and R(A) is a partition of B,
Ev′
[∑
i∈B
v′i
]
= Ev′
 ∑
i∈C(A)
v′i
+ Ev′
 ∑
i∈R(A)
v′i
 .
Let (·)+ = max{·, 0}. We will derive the following three inequalities
Ev
[∑
i∈A
θi
]
≥ Ev′
 ∑
i∈C(A)
v′i
 (1)
Ev
[∑
i∈A
(vi − θi)
+
]
≥ Ev′
 ∑
i∈R(A)
(v′i − θi)
+
 (2)
Ev′
 ∑
i∈R(A)
(v′i − θi)
+
 ≥ Ev′
 ∑
i∈R(A)
v′i
 . (3)
Summing (1), (2) and (3) with the fact that θ + (vi − θi)
+ = vi for all i ∈ A, finishes the
proof.
Inequality (1) is satisfied by the definition of α-balanced threshold. For inequality (2),
notice that
Ev
[∑
i∈A
(vi − θi)
+
]
(a)
= Ev
[∑
i∈N
(vi − θi)
+
]
(b)
= Ev′
[∑
i∈N
(vi − θi)
+
]
≥ Ev′
 ∑
i∈R(A)
(v′i − θi)
+

where (a) holds by definition of A, i.e., prize i is selected in A if vi ≥ θi; and (b) holds since
v, v′ are independent with the same marginal and θi is independent with vi and v
′. For
inequality (3), using the definition of α-balance threshold, we have
Ev′
 ∑
i∈R(A)
v′i
 ≤Ev′
 ∑
i∈R(A)
(θi + (v
′
i − θi)
+)

≤ (1−
1
α
) · Ev′
 ∑
i∈R(A)
v′i
+ Ev′
 ∑
i∈R(A)
(v′i − θi)
+
 ,
which implies that
Ev′
 ∑
i∈R(A)
(v′i − θi)
+
 ≥ 1
α
· Ev′
 ∑
i∈R(A)
v′i
 .
which concludes the proof.
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For matroid environment, Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012) design an algorithm which has
2-balanced threshold for the correlated benchmark (Definition A.1).
Lemma A.2 (Kleinberg and Weinberg, 2012). For matroid environment X , there exists a
2-balanced adaptive threshold
θi =
1
2
Ev′
 ∑
i∈C(Ai−1∪{i})
v′i −
∑
i∈C(Ai−1)
v′i
 ,
where Ai−1 is the set chosen till day i− 1.
Therefore, invoking Lemma A.1 and A.2, we have the the following theorem.
Theorem A.3. For matroid environment X , and for linear agents with distributions {Fi}i∈N ,
there exists a profile of adaptive threshold θ such that
Payoff[θ, {Fi}i∈N ,X ] ≥ 1/2 · EAR({Fi}i∈N ,X )
where Payoff[θ, {Fi}i∈N ,X ] is the expected welfare of setting the threshold as θi when item i
arrives, and EAR({Fi}i∈N ,X ) is the optimal ex ante relaxation.
B Necessity of assumptions for agents with private
budget
If there is no assumption on the budget distribution and the valuation distribution, even
if those distributions are independent from each other, for the single agent problem, price
posting is not a constant approximation to the optimal revenue.
Example B.1. Consider the budget distribution is the discrete equal revenue distribution,
i.e., g(i) = 1/̟ · i2, where ̟ = π2/6. Let the quantile function of the valuation distribution
be q(i) = 1/ln i. The optimal price posting revenue is a constant. Next consider the pricing
function τ(x) = 1
1−x
. From this pricing function, the value vi corresponding to payment i is
vi = i
2. Note that the revenue from this payment function is infinity, i.e.,
Payoff[τ ] ≥ lim
m→∞
m∑
i=1
(i · q(vi) · g(i))
=
1
2̟
lim
m→∞
m∑
i=1
1
i · ln i
=
1
2̟
lim
m→∞
ln lnm→∞.
Therefore, the gap between price posting and the optimal mechanism is infinite.
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Comparing to Feng et al. (2019), we propose a reduction framework for general pay-
off maximization (e.g., welfare maximization) using pricing-based mechanisms. Note that
this reduction does not hold for anonymous pricing considered in Feng et al. (2019). The
main reason is that anonymity is not maintained in the reduction framework. For exam-
ple, for the welfare objective, prophet inequalities indicate that anonymous pricing achieves
2-approximation for linear agents, while we show that anonymous pricing is not a constant
approximation for budgeted agents even when the valuations and the budgets for all agents
are public information.
Example B.2. Consider there is a single item and 2 agents. Suppose ǫ < 1 is a constant
arbitrarily close to 0. Agent 1 has value v1 =
1
ǫ2
and budget w1 = 1. Agent 2 has value
v2 =
1
ǫ
and budget w2 =
1
ǫ
. By allocating the item to agent 1, and the optimal welfare is 1
ǫ2
.
For any anonymous price p, suppose agent 2 arrives first. If p ≤ 1
ǫ
, agent 2 gets the item
and welfare is 1
ǫ
. If p > 1
ǫ
, since the budget of agent 1 is 1, she can purchase the lottery with
allocation at most ǫ, and the total welfare of anonymous pricing is at most 2
ǫ
. Therefore, if
ǫ→ 0, the approximation ratio 1
2ǫ
→∞.
C Numerical Result for Uniformly Distributed Private-
budgeted Agents
In this section, we discuss the numerical results of the approximation ratios of revenue-
maximization for i.i.d. private-budgeted agents with value and budget drawn uniformly
from [0, 1] independently. This example and the optimal mechanisms have been studied
in Che and Gale (2000) for a single agent and Pai and Vohra (2014) for multiple agents. For
both scenarios, the optimal mechanisms are complicated. However, Figure 1a suggests that
for a single agent, posting a single price is a good approximation to the optimal mechanism
for all ex ante probability constraint; Figure 1b suggests that for multi-agents, simple pricing
based mechanisms (i.e. oblivious posted pricing and marginal payoff maximization) achieve
good approximation to the optimal mechanism. Next, we explain how the numerical results
are computed.
First we focus on the single agent problem, i.e., the calculation of the price-posting
revenue curve and ex ante revenue curve illustrated in Figure 1a. For the price-posting
revenue curve, we directly compute the probability the item is sold and the corresponding
revenue for any price p. Thus, we can have the closed-form characterization for the mapping
from the ex ante allocation constraint to the optimal price-posting revenue. For the ex
ante revenue curve, by approximating the continuous uniform distribution with a discretized
uniform distribution, we can write this optimization problem as a finite dimensional linear
program, which allows us to numerically evaluate the optimal ex ante revenue given any ex
ante allocation constraint q. By evaluating the curve on quantiles q ∈ {0, 1/50, . . . , 1} with
grid size 1/50, we have the numerical figure for the ex ante revenue curve.
For the multi-agent problem, since both oblivious posted pricing and marginal payoff
mechanism are pricing based mechanism, the revenues of both mechanisms for private-
budgeted agents are equivalent to the revenues of both mechanisms for linear agents with the
same price-posting revenue curve. By the above paragraph, we have the closed-form for the
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price-posting revenue curve, which pins down the value distribution of such linear agents.
First note that since agents are i.i.d., the revenue from oblivious posted pricing (OPP) is the
same as sequential posted pricing (SPP). We compute the revenue for both OPP and SPP
using an dynamic programming (i.e. backward induction). For i.i.d. regular linear agents,
the revenue of the marginal payoff mechanism is the same as the revenue of the second price
auction with monopoly reserve, which can be solved analytically. Finally, we can numerical
calculate the optimal ex ante relaxation using the ex ante revenue curve for a single agent,
and evaluate the approximation ratio for both mechanisms when number of agents ranges
from 1 to 15.
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